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Abstract   
We address the problem of a participatory decision-making process where a shared priority list of 
alternatives has to be obtained while avoiding inconsistent decisions, related to the “Condorcet 
paradox”. An agent-based model (ABM) is proposed to mimic this process in different social 
networks of stakeholders who interact according to an opinion dynamics model. Simulations’ 
results show the efficacy of interaction in avoiding the paradox and finding a transitive and, above 
all, shared decision. These findings are in agreement with real participation experiences regarding 
transport planning decisions and can give useful suggestions on how to plan an effective 
participation process for sustainable policy-making based on opinion consensus. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
When more actors are involved in a decision-making process, individual preferences, in the form 
of an ordered list of alternatives, have to be aggregated into a unique collective decision. Among 
the many different aggregation methods that can be used to this aim (List, 2013), one of the most 
commonly adopted is the so called Pairwise Majority Rule (PMR). Nevertheless, the result of 
aggregation by the PMR can be an intransitive collective preference list, falling into the so called 
“Condorcet paradox” or “Condorcet cycle”. It was studied for the first time in 1785 by the Marquis 
de Condorcet (1785) who demonstrated that, when more than two alternatives have to be ranked 
(for example A, B and C), the collective preference list can be intransitive (A>B>C>A), even if 
the individual preference orders are transitive (A>B>C). The final consequence is the impossibility 
of taking a consistent decision. 
In this paper we present an agent-based model (ABM) able to mimic a participatory decision-
making process where a given number of stakeholders, linked by a social network, exchange 
opinions (represented by their individual lists of preferences) in order to find a shared and transitive 
collective decision (i.e., a collective list). The model can be applied to all the decision-making 
contexts that involve participation in complex decisions with widespread collective impact, e.g. 
transport policy-making, environmental policy-making, land use planning, etc.  
Lack of public participation in decision-making processes is considered one of the main causes of 
projects’ failure (Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009), as confirmed by the wide diffusion of public 
infrastructure projects strongly opposed by the local community protests, with the so called 
  
“NIMBY” syndrome (“Not In My BackYard”). It is now widely recognized the importance of 
involving all the actors (i.e. the stakeholders) along the decision-making processes in order to 
choose decisions which reflect the real needs and opinions of the interested parties (i.e. “most 
shared” solutions) rather than just the technically “best” ones. This is particularly true for policy-
making at the urban scale, where citizens reflect a great variety of interests and opinions.  
Public policy-making, in general, requires quantitative methods to evaluate to what degree each 
alternative satisfies a set of criteria selected to measure the achievement of objectives. Moreover, 
the decision-maker has to choose or make rankings among more than two alternatives (policies, 
projects or objectives). In such cases, decision-support methods (DSMs) such as Cost Benefit 
Analysis (CBA), or Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA) are considered adequate to assess the 
convenience of each alternative (Cascetta, 2009). Finally, the decision-maker has to prioritize the 
alternatives, usually by a ranking scale. When it comes to participatory decision-making processes, 
the problem of aggregating individual preferences is not trivial, being largely investigated by social 
choice theory (Arrow, 1951; Elster and Hylland, 1986). Indeed, the aggregation of individual 
stakeholders’ preferences could determine an inconsistent decision and, most of all, it could not 
satisfactorily reflect stakeholders’ expectations. In this respect, the aim of the model here presented 
is twofold: first, try to understand how it is possible to avoid, through the opinions interaction, the 
decision deadlock that can arise from the aggregation of the individual preferences with the PMR; 
second, try to find a collective transitive list able to satisfy stakeholders to a high degree, i.e. to 
find a highly shared collective decision. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the “Condorcet paradox” is introduced together 
with some strategies elaborated in order to avoid it. In section 3 an ABM is proposed to analyse 
some basic conditions to overcome the paradox, whilst assuring an acceptable degree of collective 
consensus. There we discuss also the simulations performed and the results together with some 
preliminary considerations about model validation. Finally, Section 4 provides some general 
conclusions. 
 
 
2. THE PROBLEM OF THE “CONDORCET PARADOX” IN PARTICIPATORY 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
Let us start with a simple example showing the appearance of the Condorcet paradox when the 
Pairwise Majority Rule is adopted for generating a collective preference list by aggregating 
individual ones. Consider five stakeholders (𝑁 = 5), each one with an individual list of four 
alternatives A, B, C and D (𝑛 = 4). Using PMR, the ranking of the collective list is obtained by 
computing how many times each alternative in a pair is preferred to the other one. In particular, 
the pairwise preferences of each individual list are coded as components of a binary vector 
assuming the values of  +1 and  -11. Finally, the collective list is derived by applying a majority 
rule to the binary vectors.  
As already anticipated, the aggregation of single transitive preference lists by the PMR does not 
exclude the possibility of intransitive collective lists as result, thus violating the ordering axiom 
(Arrow, 1951). Actually, by applying the PMR to the individual preference orders shown in Table 
1, the final result will be what is called a “Condorcet cycle”, i.e. A>B>C>D>A. 
 
 
                                                     
 
1 As an example, for the couple of alternatives AB, if A is preferred to B then AB= +1, vice versa AB= -1. 
  
Table 1 Condorcet cycle resulted from aggregation of preference orders by PMR (sh = stakeholder). 
sh Preference order AB AC AD BC BD CD 
1 A>B>C>D  +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 
2 D>A>B>C  +1 +1  -1 +1  -1  -1 
3 B>C>D>A   -1  -1  -1 +1 +1 +1 
4 D>A>C>B  +1 +1  -1  -1  -1  -1 
5 B>A>C>D   -1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 
PMR result:  +1 +1  -1 +1 +1 +1 
Collective list:  A>B>C>D>A 
 
It is easy to demonstrate that the probability of falling into a “Condorcet cycle” increases with the 
number of alternatives: given 𝑛 alternatives, then 𝑛! possible transitive orders do exist, while 𝑛 ∗
(𝑛 − 1)/2  is the number of pairs and, therefore, 2𝑛∗(𝑛−1)/2 are all the possible - transitive and 
intransitive - binary vectors. Therefore, the probability to have a transitive list will be 𝑃(𝑛) =
𝑛!
2𝑛∗(𝑛−1)/2
  and it rapidly decreases with 𝑛, going to 0 when 𝑛 → ∞  (Fig. 1a). A helpful way to 
visualize the increasing asymmetry between the number of transitive and intransitive lists when 𝑛 
increases is shown in Fig. 1b, representing a simplified pictorial view of the “collective preference 
space”: the black cells in the grid indicate the 𝑛! transitivity “islands” randomly distributed over 
the much larger intransitivity “sea”, represented by the white cells (for 𝑛 = 6, only 𝑛! = 720 
transitive lists out of 32748 possible lists exist). 
   
Fig. 1. (a) Probability P(n) of transitive orders as a function of the number of alternatives n. (b) Collective preference 
space: the few transitive lists are represented as black “islands” within the “sea” of intransitive lists. 
It has been demonstrated that the occurrence of the paradox increases also with the number of 
agents, for example in “a large population of non interacting voters” (Raffaelli and Marsili, 2005). 
On the other hand, the result changes if agents interact before deciding. Actually, interaction is at 
the basis of most of the traditional participation tools (Rowe and Frewer, 2000), even in the form 
of the “remote” and anonymous interaction of the Delphi method (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963). In 
this respect, Raffaelli and Marsili (2005) demonstrated that, the larger the number of alternatives, 
the easier is to have a collective transitive list in an interacting population. Columbu et al. (2008) 
also show the effectiveness of interaction by evaluating the probability of collective transitive lists 
as a function of an interaction range and find out an optimal distance (namely a Kemeny distance) 
among agents able to reduce the probability of “Condorcet paradox”. The widespread diffusion of 
digital social media allows today more and more people to easily interact and exchange opinions. 
On the other hand, the group decision-making based on decision-support methods usually provides 
averaged collective decisions which can be very far from each individual preference. 
(a) 
(b)  
  
Summarizing, these models present two main drawbacks:  
 they do not explicitly represent the real structure of the relationships among agents; 
 they do not adequately consider the degree of consensus of the single agent against the 
final collective decision. 
In order to overcome these limits and contextualize the problem in the field of collective decisions 
in sustainable policy-making, we present in the following an ABM which is able to reproduce the 
opinion dynamics interaction among stakeholders, linked by social networks with different 
topologies. We show this model allows both to circumvent the “Condorcet paradox” and find a 
shared transitive collective decision, i.e. a final collective list with a high similarity with the 
individual ones. 
 
3. THE AGENT BASED MODEL 
Opinion dynamics models have been largely used in the last years to capture the opinion evolution 
of groups of interacting agents, in order to investigate the underlying forces leading towards 
consensus formation, both on regular and complex network topologies (Hegselmann and Krause, 
2002; Sznajd-Weron and Sznaid, 2000; Galam, 2002; Pluchino et al., 2005). A comprehensive 
review of the state of the art of social dynamics and opinion dynamics models based on statistical 
physics can be found in Castellano et al. (2009). Computer simulations play an important role in 
the study of social dynamics and one of the most successful methodologies used is Agent-based 
simulations. The latter are also widely used for applications to social and economic systems and 
they are also used as a tool to foster stakeholder engagement and collaboration (Voinov and 
Bousquet, 2010).  
In a previous study (Le Pira et al., 2013), an ABM was already implemented to simulate the opinion 
dynamics on a particular stakeholder network where a binary decision has to be taken about a 
single transport policy measure: the various agents interact with each other and the conditions 
leading to the convergence of opinions according to a majority rule were investigated.  
In this paper, a new ABM is presented to reproduce interaction in stakeholder networks with 
different topologies, where each stakeholder has an individual preference list over a set of (more 
than two) alternatives, and a collective preference list has to be found (see also Le Pira et al., 
2015a). The aim is to see how a repeated interaction can help to escape from intransitive solutions 
and to foster a convergence of opinions towards a collective consistent solution with a high degree 
of consensus. The proposed ABM is here enriched by further exploring the parameter space and 
by considering other possible ways, different from interaction, to “escape” from the paradox: in 
this respect, we compare the results obtained through dynamical interaction among agents with 
other two different strategies, devoid of interaction, in order to see if they are equally successful 
in both avoiding the paradox and finding a transitive shared solution. Furthermore, the model will 
be used to reproduce real participation experiences, representing a first attempt of model 
validation. 
Our model has been built within the software programming environment NetLogo (Wilensky, 
1999), particularly suitable for agent-based modelling and simulations. 
 
3.1 The ABM algorithm  
Let’s first describe the setup of the agent based model, common to all the strategies considered. 
  
The 𝑁 stakeholders 𝑆(𝑖) (i=1,…,N) are represented as nodes of an undirected network, according 
to a selected topology with fixed connectivity. A set of alternatives is given and a preference list is 
randomly assigned to each stakeholder, thus representing his/her opinion. In addition, an integer 
random variable 𝐼(𝑖) is assigned to each stakeholder 𝑆(𝑖) to quantify his/her influence, i.e. the 
capability of influencing the opinions of his/her directly connected nodes (first neighbours) in the 
network. As explained in section 2, each preference list is transformed into a binary vector (see 
table 1), and the collective binary vector (PMR) is calculated; finally, the PMR is once again 
converted into a collective preference list, which can be transitive or intransitive. In the latter case 
we fall into a “Condorcet cycle”. Since one of our goals is to escape from these cycles, we choose 
the initial condition (𝑡 = 0) in order to ensure that the initial collective list is intransitive. 
 
Fig. 2. Geometric interpretation of the overlap, as the scalar product between two binary vectors in the m-dimensional 
space (case of 𝒏 = 𝟑 alternatives, 𝒎 = 𝟑 components of the 𝟖 possible binary vectors). 
However, as already said, we are interested in finding a final decision, represented by a collective 
list, which not only has to be transitive, but should also reflect quite appreciably the individual 
preferences of the stakeholders. This latter requirement can be verified by introducing a quantity 
called “overlap”, that is a measure of similarity (or closeness) between any two lists. If 𝑛 is the 
number of alternatives and 𝑚 = 𝑛 ∗ (𝑛 − 1)/2 is the number of the possible pairwise couples, i.e. 
the number of components of each binary vector, the overlap is defined as:  
𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗) =
1
𝑚
∑ 𝑉𝑘(𝑖) ∙ 𝑉𝑘(𝑗)
𝑚
𝑘=1
   (1) 
where 𝑉𝑘(𝑖) and 𝑉𝑘(𝑗) are the 𝑘-th components of the two binary vectors 𝑽(𝑖) and 𝑽(𝑗) 
representing the preference lists of stakeholders 𝑆(𝑖) and 𝑆(𝑗). From this definition follows that 
the overlap 𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗) assumes values in the closed interval [−1,1]. In particular, if 𝑽(𝑖) = 𝑽(𝑗), then 
𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1; if all the homologous components 𝑉𝑘(𝑖) and 𝑉𝑘(𝑗) have opposite signs, then 𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗) =
−1; if the components with opposite and equal signs are in the same quantity , then 𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗) = 0. 
As an example, the similarity between two lists of 𝑛 = 3 alternatives can be represented by the 
alignment between the two related binary vectors of 𝑚 = 3 components in the m-dimensional 
space and the overlap coincides with the scalar product between these vectors; in this example, 
shown in Fig. 2, the two vectors are partially aligned and the overlap is 0.33. 
The same formula can, of course, be used to calculate the overlap between any individual vector 
𝑽(𝑖) and the collective vector 𝑽(𝑐), i.e. 𝑂(𝑖, 𝑐) = 
1
𝑚
∑ 𝑉𝑘(𝑖) ∙ 𝑉𝑘(𝑐)
𝑚
𝑘=1 . For example, it can be 
used at the beginning of a simulation (i.e. at 𝑡 = 0) to evaluate the similarity between each 
individual list and the corresponding collective intransitive list, represented by 𝑽𝑡=0(𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟); since 
  
the initial individual lists are randomly selected, one might expect that the average overlap of these 
lists with the collective list, calculated as ?̅?𝑡=0(𝑖, 𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑂𝑡=0(𝑖, 𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟)
𝑁
𝑖=1 , assumes values 
close to zero. 
 
The max overlap strategy 
At this point, it is quite natural to imagine a first possible strategy to escape from the Condorcet 
cycle without any interaction among agents. Actually, at t=0, one could select, among all the 
possible transitive lists, the one whose binary vector 𝑽𝑡=0(𝑐𝑡𝑟
∗ ) has the maximum overlap with 
𝑽𝑡=0(𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟), i.e.:  
𝑂𝑡=0(𝑐𝑡𝑟
∗ , 𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟) =
1
𝑚
∑ 𝑉𝑘
𝑡=0(𝑐𝑡𝑟
∗ ) ∙ 𝑉𝑘
𝑡=0(𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟)
𝑚
𝑘=1
= max{𝑂𝑡=0(𝑐𝑡𝑟 , 𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟)}  (2) 
Assuming that closeness between two cells in the collective preference space (see Fig. 1b) is a 
rough measure of their overlap, this strategy just corresponds to find, in this space, the “transitive 
island” (grey cell) closest to the intransitive initial list (bold white cell) (see Fig. 3a). Nevertheless, 
it is quite probable that the average overlap ?̅?𝑡=0(𝑖, 𝑐𝑡𝑟
∗ ) between the selected transitive list and all 
the individual lists (proportional to the colour intensity of grey cells in the collective preference 
space) will be close to zero, like ?̅?𝑡=0(𝑖, 𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟). Actually, this is exactly what happens, as it will be 
shown later through the simulations. In other words, the final collective list found by the “max 
overlap strategy” is transitive, but it does not fulfil the requirement of appreciably reflecting the 
individual preferences (in terms of average overlap). 
 
  
Fig. 3. Representation of (a) the max overlap strategy and (b) the random strategy in the collective preference space. 
The random strategy 
From the previous considerations it appears that, in order to get a transitive collective list with a 
higher average overlap with the individual lists, it is necessary a searching strategy able to find a 
darker grey island of transitivity in the collective preference space, starting from the initial cell of 
intransitivity. A random searching strategy has been tested to this aim. This implies the following 
dynamical algorithm: starting from the initial intransitive collective list, at each step 𝑡 > 0 each 
stakeholder 𝑆(𝑖) randomly changes his preference list and the corresponding collective preference 
list is derived, as already explained for the previous strategy. The process ends when a transitive 
collective list is obtained, generally after a small number of steps. In the collective preference 
space, this corresponds to draw a “random path” in the sea of the intransitive lists, until a transitive 
island is found (see Fig. 3b). However, due to the randomness of this procedure, the corresponding 
(a) (b)  
  
average overlap ?̅?𝑡=0(𝑖, 𝑐𝑡𝑟) results to be again very low.  As simulations will confirm, even if the 
algorithm is further run - finding other randomly selected islands - there would not be an increase 
in the average overlap. This means that the random strategy fails too and that it is necessary to find 
a more suitable searching strategy, able to reflect the individual preferences.  
 
The opinion dynamics strategy 
As already said, interaction among stakeholders is a key of success for a transparent and shared 
decision-making process. In our simulations we try to mimic it through an opinion dynamics model 
that reproduces the opinion changing process in networks of connected and interacting people. In 
particular, at each step 𝑡 > 0 , each stakeholder 𝑆(𝑖) interacts only with his  𝑁(𝑖) first neighbours 
{𝑆(𝑗)}𝑗=1,…,𝑁(𝑖) in the network. Due to the interaction, 𝑆(𝑖) has a certain probability of changing 
opinion, depending on both the influence 𝐼(𝑗) of his neighbours and the similarity of their lists. 
More precisely, we assume that 𝑆(𝑖) will change his opinion by adopting the list of his neighbour 
𝑆(𝑘) with a probability 𝑃(𝑖, 𝑘) =
𝐼(𝑘)
∑ 𝐼(𝑗)
𝑁(𝑖)
𝑗=1
, but only if the overlap 𝑂(𝑖, 𝑘) > 0; otherwise, 𝑆(𝑖) will 
maintain his/her list. After all the stakeholders updated their lists at time 𝑡, a new PMR - and its 
corresponding collective preference list - is calculated: if the latter is transitive, the new average 
overlap ?̅?𝑡(𝑖, 𝑐𝑡𝑟) is computed, recorded and plotted as function of time (Fig. 4 a); on the other 
hand, if during the process a Condorcet cycle occurs, the solution is discharged. In both the cases 
the algorithm goes on, in order to find more and more shared transitive solutions.  
This procedure can be visualized again in the collective preference space, where an iterative and 
progressive path among transitivity islands, through adjacent intransitivity cells, is followed (Fig. 
4 b). The striking point is that, contrary to what happens in the case of the random strategy, in 
general this path leads to transitive islands with higher overlap, until the “darkest” grey island is 
reached, i.e. the one with the maximum achievable overlap. In fact, as it clearly appears looking 
at the average overlap behaviour versus time (see again Fig. 4 a), the first transitive lists found 
usually show a low overlap, but, when the interaction is repeated, ?̅?𝑡(𝑖, 𝑐𝑡𝑟) presents a growing – 
even if not monotone – trend, until it reaches a stationary state, corresponding to its maximum 
value (in agreement with the trajectory in Fig. 4 b). The final list is therefore assumed as the 
transitive “most shared” collective solution, appreciably reflecting the individual preferences of 
all the stakeholders. 
   
Fig. 4 (a) Plot of average overlap over time and (b) representation of the opinion dynamics in the collective preference 
space. 
 
The main routines described above are summarized in Fig. 5.  
 
(a) (b)  
  
 
 
Fig. 5. Flow chart of the agent based algorithm. 
 
3.2 Stakeholder networks description 
Simulations aim at investigating how the collective decision-making process could be affected by 
the features of the participation process. In this respect, several simulations were performed by 
comparing the different strategies discussed in the previous section in order to select a transitive 
and shared collective decision, in particular when different numbers of stakeholders and different 
topologies are considered. Stakeholders are linked in social networks, i.e. graphs consisting of 
nodes (i.e. the social agents) and links (i.e. the relationships among them). Social networks are 
usually complex networks, whose structure can be of different kinds and dynamically evolving in 
time (Boccaletti et al., 2006).  
Table 2 gives a short description of the different undirected networks used for the simulations (for 
INPUT
- n alternatives
- N number of stakeholders
- T topology of the 
network 
- I influence distribution
N binary
vectors
collective binary 
vector
collective preference 
list (t=0)
transitive 
list
N preference
lists randomly
assigned
YES
NO CONDORCET 
CYCLE
PMR
t<tthreshold
NO
OPINION 
DYNAMICS
N binary 
vectors 
collective binary 
vector
collective preference
list (t)
transitive 
list
N preference
lists
YES
NO
AVERAGE 
OVERLAP
PMR
OUTPUT
final collective list = 
collective list (t)
Step 1: SETUP (t=0)
Step 4. OPINION DYNAMICS (t>0) 
YES
Step 2: MAX OVERLAP TEST  
(t=0)
MAX OVERLAP TEST
Comparison among the 
intransitive list and all the 
possible transitive lists
OUTPUT
final collective list = transitive list
c*trans with O(cintr, c*trans) = max
O(cintr, ctrans) 
AVERAGE 
OVERLAP
RANDOM TEST
N binary 
vectors 
collective binary
vector
collective preference
list (t)
transitive 
list
N preference 
lists randomly 
assigned
YES
NO CONDORCET 
CYCLE
AVERAGE 
OVERLAP
PMR
OUTPUT
final collective list = 
collective list (t)
Step 3. RANDOM TEST (t>0) 
At each time t>0 each stakeholder 
list randomly changes
CONDORCET 
CYCLE
YES
  
a review see Estrada, 2011). 
 
Table 2 Networks used for the simulations. Node colours are different opinions at t=0, node radius is proportional to 
the node influence. The number of neighbours of a given node, i.e. the “degree” of the node, is indicated with k. 
Network Description 
NetLogo 
interface 
Star One central node (hub) is directly linked with all the other N-1 nodes. 
Every node has degree 1, except the hub that has N-1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fully connected It is a totally connected network where each node is connected  
with all the others. The degree is N-1 for all nodes. 
 
 
 
  
Scale free 
Barabasi-Albert 
(BA) (Barabasi 
and Albert, 1999) 
The network is built sequentially following the preferential attachment 
criterion: at each step a new node is added to an existing node with a 
probability proportional to its degree k. This process generates a network 
with a power law degree distribution, i.e. 𝑃(𝑘)~𝑘−𝛾 with 𝛾 = 3. 
 
Scale Free Tree 
with fully 
connected hubs 
The network is built sequentially following a modified preferential 
attachment criterion where one path only exists for each pair of nodes, 
i.e. there are not “triangles of nodes” in the network. It can be therefore 
classified as a tree with some hubs, i.e. a few nodes with a very high 
degree. We further link all the hubs in a fully connected subgraph. This 
process generates a network with a power law degree distribution, i.e. 
𝑃(𝑘)~𝑘−𝛾 with 𝛾 = 2 ÷ 3. 
 
 
Small world 
network (Watts 
and Strogatz, 
1998) 
Small world networks are “highly clustered, like regular lattices, yet they 
have short characteristic path lengths, like random graphs”. Nodes are 
linked with their first 4 neighbours in a circle, with a certain probability 
p of rewiring, i.e. to remove some links with the first neighbours and 
replace them with links pointing to random nodes (in general p = 2%). 
The average degree is 4.  
 
These prototypical networks are chosen to represent different stakeholder groups and the related 
interaction processes. The rationale behind the selected networks is that all these topologies can 
likely be found in real participation processes: (i) the star network is a typical structure of the 
Delphi practices, where a facilitator is linked with all the actors involved, but they are not linked 
to each other to avoid the risk of “leadership” (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963); (ii) the fully connected 
network can represent quite well the focus group meetings, aimed at analysing a specific topic 
with the interested stakeholders affected by the decision; (iii) the scale free BA shows a power law 
degree distribution with few high-connected nodes and many low-connected nodes and it is a 
typical structure found in many social networks (Barabasi and Albert 1999); (iv) the scale free tree 
with fully connected hubs also shows a power law degree distribution, but the high-connected 
nodes (i.e. the hubs) are all connected with each other and the subgroups form trees, representing 
typical hierarchical structures where the information from the nodes converges to the hubs, e.g. 
  
those that can be found in citizen councils at different levels (neighbourhood, municipal or 
regional); (v) the small-world network is a structure that has been found in several  real social 
networks, with high levels of communication efficiency thanks to the structure of regular network 
“rewired” with some long-range links (Watts and Strogatz. 1998). In addition, Bakht and El-Diraby 
(2014) demonstrated, considering infrastructure discussion networks (IDN) such as Twitter, that 
the structures of the interacting communities show characteristics of complex networks, in 
particular small-world behaviour, scale free degree distribution, and high clustering. This type of 
engagement with social media methods is also known as “Microparticipation” (Evans-Cowley and 
Griffin, 2003) and can be very interesting for the study and interpretation of the complex 
phenomenon of social interaction. 
In all the networks considered for our simulations, the influence 𝐼(𝑖) of node 𝑖-th is an integer 
random variable distributed with a Poisson law with mean 8. The simulations performed 
considered  𝑛 = 6 alternatives for each preference list, while various sets of simulations run in 
correspondence of different number of nodes ranges (from 20 to 120) and of different network 
topologies. In general, several simulation runs with the same structure but different initial 
conditions were considered for each case. In particular, the results of each simulation were 
averaged over 100 events, each of them running over 500 time steps, that have been verified to be 
enough for reaching the overlap stationary state shown in Fig. 4a. 
 
3.3 Simulation results 
Results are expressed in terms of two order parameters: (i) the asymptotic value of the average 
overlap ?̅?𝑡(𝑖, 𝑐𝑡𝑟), i.e. a measure of the similarity among the individual lists and the final collective 
one after interaction, and (ii) a parameter representing the “interaction efficiency” (𝐼𝐸), calculated 
dividing the asymptotic average overlap by the number of links 𝑛𝑙, in order to include the 
“communication costs” to be sustained in highly connected networks: 
 
𝐼𝐸 =
?̅?𝑡(𝑖, 𝑐𝑡𝑟)
𝑛𝑙
                   (3) 
 
Both these measures were also averaged over 100 simulation runs. 
In Fig. a, the (averaged) asymptotic average overlap is plotted as function of the network size 𝑁 
and for all the previously introduced network topologies. All the scores range from about 0.3 to 
0.6, that is a very good result. In particular, they stay quite high (> 0.5) when the size of the 
networks is small (𝑁 =  20), regardless of the topology. When the number of stakeholders 
increases some differences among the different networks do emerge. As expected, the fully 
connected network performs very well, because each stakeholder influences, and it is influenced, 
by all the others in the network. The same holds for the star topology, probably because there are, 
on average, only two degrees of separation between any couple of nodes. On the other hand, the 
small-world network shows the lowest values of final overlap for 𝑁 > 50, and – in the same range 
– also the performance of the scale free tree with fully connected hubs is not excellent, likely due 
to the absence of interaction triangles among stakeholders; at variance  the overlap outcome for 
the scale free BA network remains quite constant at high levels. These results represent a first 
confirmation of the robustness of the interaction strategy in finding the more shared transitivity 
solutions in the collective preference space. But it is also interesting to see what is the behaviour 
of the interaction efficiency IE for the same networks, obtained dividing the asymptotic overlap 
by the number of links for each topology. 
  
 
  
Fig. 6. Plots of (a) the final overlap and of (b) the normalized final overlap, called “interaction efficiency”, resulting 
from the interaction dynamics performed for different topologies and for an increasing number of stakeholders. 
 
As shown in Fig. 6b, if one includes the “communication costs” in the balance, for small groups 
of stakeholders (𝑁 =  20) the fully connected network becomes the less efficient if compared with 
the other topologies, while the star and the scale free tree network show the highest values of 
overlap per link. In any case, increasing the number of nodes, differences among the topologies 
diminish very quickly. Looking more in detail, in Fig. the asymptotic overlap values for each one 
of the 100 simulation runs are plotted for the various topologies and for the two limiting sizes of 
the networks (120 nodes, top panels, and 20 nodes, bottom panels), in order to appreciate their 
variability: in all the cases considered, the overlaps  appear to strongly fluctuate around the average 
values already reported in Fig.6a (here indicated by an horizontal full line), with standard 
deviations ranging from about ±0.18 for larger networks to about ±0.21 for smaller networks. 
However, the asymptotic overlaps stay always quite higher than those obtained with the other two 
strategies, i.e. the “random” test and the “max overlap” test, also reported in the bottom part of all 
the panels. 
 
Fig. 7. Plots of the asymptotic overlap over events for all the network topologies with 120 nodes (top) and 20 nodes 
(bottom) with the three strategies (“SOC” = socialization or interaction strategy; “RND” = random strategy; “NON-
SOC” = max overlap strategy). 
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Fig. 8. Plots of the final overlap (averaged over 100 events) resulting from the application of the random strategy (a) 
and the “max overlap” strategy (b) for different topologies and an increasing number of stakeholders. 
 
The latter result is confirmed by the plots in Fig. 8, where the averaged values of the asymptotic 
overlap are reported for both the “random” strategy (a) and the “max overlap” strategy (b), again 
as function of the number of stakeholders and for the various topologies considered. In both cases 
the final overlap is always quite lower than the one resulting from the interaction process and it is 
also independent of the topology (since both the tests do not involve any communication among 
the agents). In particular, with the first strategy the overlap values range from 0.08 to 0.23 while, 
with the second strategy, they go from 0.06 to 0.15.  
Summarizing, these findings confirm that, even if it is possible to imagine other strategies that 
allow to circumvent the “Condorcet paradox” faster and easier than the interaction one, only the 
collective solutions that come out from repeated discussions and opinions’ exchanges among the 
stakeholders are able to actually reflect enough the individual preferences, ensuring the “most 
shared” transitive decision, whatever the topology one decides to adopt for the interaction network. 
On the other hand, taking into account the topology of interactions, the previous results could also 
give some insights or suggestions in order to build an efficient participation process. Actually, they 
can be useful from a practical point of view because the real structures of many participation 
processes share similarities with the analysed interaction networks. Preliminary proofs derive from 
some participation experiments that were carried out for a first attempt of model validation as 
explained in the following subsection. 
 
3.4 Towards a validation of the model 
The problem of ABM validation is controversial and it is still a challenging task (Windrum et al., 
2007; Moss, 2008). A good data basis is crucial for a good model (Buchmann et al, 2016), but it 
can also be useful to directly involve stakeholders in the building of the model, i.e. the “companion 
modelling” approach (Bousquet et al., 1999; Voinov and Bousquet, 2010). 
For a first step towards validation, the results of ad hoc participation experiments are used to test 
the suitability of the model in reproducing participatory decision-making processes (Le Pira et al., 
2015b, 2015c). A first case study in our case was a participation experiment with students at the 
University of Catania (Italy), where a two-round interactive AHP was set up to elicit their 
preferences about mobility management strategies to be adopted in the university campus and to 
see how interaction among them could change their opinions; results of one round of real 
interaction among a “quite homogeneous community of stakeholders” are in agreement with those 
obtained with a simulation that reproduced a repeated interaction starting from random individual 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
20 40 60 80 100 120
o
ve
rl
ap
N
final overlap (random test) 
BA
small world circle
star
fully connected
scale free tree with
fully connected hubs 0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
20 40 60 80 100 120
o
ve
rl
ap
N
final overlap (max overlap test) 
BA
small world circle
star
fully connected
scale free tree with
fully connected hubs
(a)  (b) 
  
preferences (i.e. “heterogeneous community”) (Le Pira et al., 2015b). In particular, the values of 
the final average overlap were almost the same (0.57 from our simulation versus 0.59 from the 
experiment), while the “Condorcet paradox” did not show up in the real experiment thanks to the 
opinions of the group that were quite homogeneous. The simulated network was a fully connected 
one with exactly the same number of nodes used to mimic the interaction process that involved all 
the students in a plenary session.  
The second case study was a combined Delphi-AHP experiment about cycling mobility in Catania 
(Italy) where a panel of experts from the University and stakeholders (from the municipal transport 
company and cyclists’ associations) analysed and expressed opinions about possible strategies to 
increase the use of bicycles. The Delphi structure allowed an anonymous interaction among the 
actors and led to a convergence of opinions. The simulated network was a “star network”, where 
the hub (i.e. the facilitator) was directly linked with all the others. This could represent quite well 
the anonymous interaction process among the members of the panel, that could not communicate 
with each other but knew the other (averaged) answers. In this case the model was fed with data 
about the actual initial opinions of the stakeholders and the opinion dynamics was properly 
modified to mimic the real opinion changing process. Actually, the opinion dynamics process is 
simplified with respect to reality, since a collective preference ranking is evaluated through PMR 
(based on stakeholders’ real preference rankings) and then agents decide to align their ranking to 
the collective one according to the similarity with it (in terms of overlap); on the contrary, in the 
real experiment stakeholders were asked to “adjust” their preferences if they fell out of a range 
represented by the majority of them. Despite its simplicity, results of the simulation were in 
agreement with reality (e.g., final overlap value obtained  in the  simulation was 0.88 versus the 
value  0.80 obtained in  the experiment) and show that the model is able to suggest how to guide 
a Delphi method to reach a good convergence of opinions and avoid the risk of “Condorcet 
paradox” (Le Pira et al., 2015c). 
In conclusion, we are fully aware that a real participation interaction is not easy to control and 
sometimes it is quite difficult to draw out constructive conclusions from it. Nevertheless, the results 
of the simulations are not intended as a tool to build real networks or to “guide” the individual 
opinions, but they demonstrate to what extent the degree of interaction and the type of 
communication have an influence on the final collective decision. In our opinion, the optimum for 
a participatory planning approach can be reached neither with dictatorial single-judge processes, 
nor with diffuse participatory democracy, but with a mixed interactive process where the 
topological structure of the interacting stakeholder network can be guided by the simulation 
results. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Complex public decisions with widespread collective impacts affect multiple stakeholders and 
require a participatory approach to decision-making. 
In this paper we have shown, through an ABM which implements an opinion dynamics on 
networks with different topology, the effectiveness of a repeated interaction among stakeholders 
in order to find a collective decision, which at the same time is consistent and shared. The opinions 
are expressed in terms of preference lists of alternatives and a collective list is derived from 
aggregation of the individual ones avoiding intransitive solutions, i.e. the “Condorcet paradox”. 
The preference lists are initially randomly assigned to stakeholders, being the only way to 
guarantee a shared decision not being influenced by the existence of strong positions towards 
certain directions. Simulation results show that, even if there are other possible strategies to avoid 
  
decision deadlocks caused by the “Condorcet paradox”, only a repeated interaction among 
stakeholders allows to reach a good degree of convergence of opinions, numerically assessed in 
terms of overlap among the lists. Most of the social networks topologies considered guarantee 
good communication flows and help interaction towards a shared decision; nevertheless, the 
degree of connection largely affects the “communication costs”, with relevant differences in the 
interaction efficiency. Results of the simulations are also in agreement with some participation 
experiences regarding transport decisions, representing a first attempt to validate the model. 
Further research will tend to improve the reliability of the model with empirical data and its 
applicability to transport decision-making contexts. 
The model could be of help for policy-makers and practitioners to support stakeholder-driven 
decision-making processes about complex decisions, and could be successfully adopted also in 
other contexts different from transport planning in order to reach within a reasonable time a more 
participated decision.  
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